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ABSTRACT 
 
GREG MOLE: Republicanism without a Republic: Political Culture in Consular France, 
1799-1804 
(Under the direction of Jay Smith) 
 
This thesis examines Napoleon’s engagement with the ideology, language, and 
practices of the French Revolution to explain social and political developments that 
ultimately contradicted the period’s republican ideals.  Revolutionary republicanism 
provided Napoleon with a compelling ideological basis upon which to construct the 
consular regime, one that could command popular support and mask his administration’s 
repressive tendencies.  As I demonstrate, however, his continued usage of republican 
practices and concepts in many ways changed the meaning of revolutionary 
republicanism.  In effect, the idioms and rituals of a laicized, republican past were recast 
to suit the needs of a Gallican, tutelary present.  By exploring this dynamic, my work 
highlights both the significance of the revolutionary tradition within consular politics, and 
the fundamental malleability of its political ideals. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Historians have relied upon a language of rupture to describe the relationship 
between the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period.  In part, this trend stems from 
the scholarly emphasis on discontinuity among the different revolutionary stages.  
François Furet, for instance, argued that the Directory constituted a repudiation of the 
Revolution’s earlier political themes—a recrudescence of social interests that had been 
markedly absent in the politics prior to Thermidor.1  Where more recent scholarship has 
questioned the timing of this disjuncture, few have challenged its existence.  Instead, the 
point of rupture has moved farther along the timeline of revolutionary events, focusing 
increasingly on 18 Brumaire, and making the distance between the Revolution and 
Consulate seem even more pronounced.2  This idea of a conceptual gap—a break in the 
political imaginary in 1799—diminishes the complexities of Napoleon’s relationship with 
the revolutionary past, obscuring key ideological, political, and cultural continuities.  It 
also places revolutionary republicanism in a state of stasis by drawing attention away 
from the ways in which it was reproduced and changed through later developments. 
                                                
1 François Furet, Penser la Révolution Française (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), 100-101. 
 
2 See, for example, Andrew Jainchill, Reimagining Politics after the Terror: The Republican Origins of 
French Liberalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 237-241.  Jainchill challenges the idea of 
a rupture between the political practices of the Convention and the Direectory.  He also downplays the 
disruptive role of the series of reactionary coups launched during the directorial period.  Yet for all this 
emphasis on continuity, he argues that Brumaire constituted a point of disjuncture, one in which a “liberal-
authoritarian” political order restructured the political imaginary.  See also Pierre Serna, La République des 
girouettes: 1789-1815 et au-delà: une anomalie politique: la France de l’extrême centre (Paris: Champ 
Vallon, 2005).  Serna understands revolutionary and early Napoleonic history as a palinodal string of 
radical and conservative governments followed by centrist regimes that repudiated earlier political 
developments. 
  2 
 
 
Methodological considerations have heightened this sense of discontinuity.  The 
historiography of the French Revolution centers on the study of political culture, placing 
an emphasis on the discursive and normative developments undergirding, and resulting 
from, the Revolution.3   Conversely, works on the Napoleonic period have generally 
eschewed historical lexicography and studies of political symbolism in favor of 
biography and traditional political narrative.  Where the former has sought to establish 
links between the ideals and political symbolism of the Old Regime and Revolution—
debunking revolutionary claims of historical exceptionalism by pointing to the significant 
overlap between the two periods—the ongoing social and institutional focus of 
Napoleonic scholarship has made it difficult to uncover similar connections between the 
Revolution and the Consulate.  This lacuna, in turn, has served to elevate Napoleon’s 
superficial engagement with the revolutionary tradition through propaganda above other 
instances of symbolic and ideological continuity.  Although recent scholarship has begun 
to shed light on some of the connections between these two periods, the methodological 
gap obscuring these links nonetheless remains pronounced.4 
                                                
3 For one of the foundational works on revolutionary political culture, see Keith Michael Baker, Inventing 
the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); for a compilation of studies 
defining the political culture paradigm, see Keith Michael Baker, ed., The Political Culture of the Old 
Regime (Oxford: Pergamon, 1987), Colin Lucas, The Political Culture of the French Revolution (Oxford: 
Pergamon, 1988), François Furet and Mona Ozouf, eds., The Transformation of Political Culture 1789-
1848 (Oxford: Pergamon, 1989), and Keith Michael Baker, ed., The Terror (Oxford: Pergamon, 1994); for 
a more concise and workable definition see Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French 
Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); for earlier incarnations of political culture 
theory see Mona Ozouf, Festivals and the French Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1988) and Maurice Agulhon, Marianne au Combat: I’Imagerie et la Symbolique Républicaines de 1789 à 
1880 (Paris: Flammarion, 1979). 
 
4 See Howard Brown, Ending the French Revolution: Violence, Justice, and Repression from the Terror to 
Napoleon (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006). Brown traces the development of violence 
under the Revolution, arguing that new responses to domestic conflict played an important role in shaping 
the sociopolitical order under Napoleon. See also Philip Dwyer, ed., Napoleon and Europe (Harlow, UK: 
Longman, 2001) and Natalie Petiteau, Voies nouvelles pour l’histoire du Premier Empire: Territoires. 
Pouvoirs. Identités (Paris: La Boutique de l’Histoire, 2003).  Both volumes develop new approaches to the 
Consulate and Empire, emphasizing in particular the incorporation of regional and departmental 
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This work seeks to bridge this gap by combining approaches to political culture 
with the social and institutional perspectives prevalent within Napoleonic scholarship.  In 
particular, it attempts to shed light on the recurring use of republican ideals and practices 
to explain and understand political developments during the Napoleonic period.  I argue 
that Napoleon constructed his authority around a symbolic relationship with the 
Revolution, developing power and legitimacy through various claims of continuity and 
discontinuity.  In reproducing and repackaging the ideology and political symbolism of 
the Revolution, however, his regime fundamentally changed the meaning of 
revolutionary republicanism.  The Revolution that the Consulate made for itself was a 
hybrid product that repackaged a laicized, republican past to suit the designs of a 
Gallican, authoritarian present.  Such a transformation required a selective identification 
with the revolutionary tradition—an engagement with some of its symbolic and 
ideological aspects counterpoised with the neglect of others—and the recovery of Old 
Regime discourse.  This study, then, seeks not only to show the mechanisms of power 
through which Napoleon made himself into the center of the post-Brumairian state, but 
also the recurring political and cultural negotiations undergirding this transition. 
In examining the ways in which Napoleon operated within the revolutionary past, 
it is necessary to understand what this past encompassed.  Featuring frequent purges, 
coups, and reactionary revolts, the Revolution offered a fragmented administrative 
legacy.  Ideologically, however, the revolutionaries of the 1790s remained consistent in 
their attachment to republican ideals.  This republicanism itself was an imprecise 
category, broad in both theoretical scope and its patterns of implementation.  
                                                                                                                                            
perspectives to the study of these administrations, and thus expanding upon the traditional social and 
institutional narratives that predominate within Napoleonic historiography.  Neither work, however, 
devotes significant attention to the cultural links between the Revolution and the Napoleonic periods. 
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Nonetheless, important consistencies manifested themselves.  Revolutionary 
republicanism was fundamentally participatory, offering a broad, if not universal, male 
franchise, an expansive understanding of citizenship, and a number of civic prerogatives.5  
Republicans, moreover, remained consistent in their desire not only to reform the state, 
but also to reshape behavioral patterns and social norms, which were understood 
collectively by the French term mœurs.  The early conventionnels and Jacobins operated 
in absolutes, demanding vigilant policing to achieve moral regeneration and develop 
passion for the common weal.6  Along the same lines, the more conservative Directory 
sought to retrain citizens through a variety of civic projects meant to inculcate the values 
of commercial republicanism and restore social stability.7  These competing currents of 
republican thought and practice meant that the Napoleonic regime was able to define 
itself through republicanism even when its policies proved incompatible with certain 
aspects of this ideology, particularly its broader cultural themes.  Moreover, by providing 
a broad conceptual landscape upon which revolutionary republicanism could be 
disaggregated, repackaged, and reformulated, this assortment of republican modalities 
                                                
5 Revolutionary republicanism drew upon a variety of ideologies.  Inspiration came from such diverse 
sources as classical models from Greece and Rome, natural law theory, and works of political economy.  
The Revolution did not so much systematize these different modalities of republican thought as transform 
them from theory into practice.  For useful surveys of eighteenth-century and revolutionary republican 
discourse, see Richard Whatmore, Republicanism and the French Revolution: An Intellectual History of 
Jean-Baptiste Say’s Political Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) and Johnson Wright, A 
Classical Republican in Eighteenth-Century France: The Political Thought of Mably (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1997).  For the actualization of republican principles by revolutionary politics 
see Keith Michael Baker, “Transformations of Classical Republicanism in Eighteenth-Century France,” 
Journal of Modern History 73 (March 2001): 32-53. 
 
6 Charles Walton, Policing Public Opinion in the French Revolution: The Culture of Calumny and the 
Problem of Free Speech (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 33. 
 
7 James Livesey, Making Democracy in the French Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2001), 113. 
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made possible the transformation of the Revolution’s political ideals during the consular 
period. 
In analyzing this process, I employ a model of structural change pioneered by 
Marshall Sahlins and refined by William Sewell.8  In particular, this approach sheds light 
on how attempts to understand disruptive events through a particular cultural framework 
ultimately results in the transformation of that framework.  It is useful because it allows 
for the in-depth study of a period’s norms, values, and ideologies—an essentially 
synchronic narrative—while also accounting for change over time.9  Sahlins employed 
this system to explore the impact of European contact on Hawaiian religious and cultural 
practices; I use it to observe how the Napoleonic deployment of revolutionary practices 
and discourse changed republican ideology.  18 Brumaire, the senatus consulta of 1802 
and 1804 (senatorial decrees that respectively declared Napoleon Consul for life and 
emperor), Napoleon’s imperial coronation—not to mention daily political practice—each 
constituted challenges to republican principles that had to be explained away.  Rather 
than destabilizing disturbances, however, these developments represented new loci of 
contestation and negotiation, functioning to modify gradually the nature of revolutionary 
republicanism.  This perspective allows for an understanding of Napoleonic history that 
                                                
8 Sewell works off the model that Sahlins developed in Islands of History (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1985), but makes several key adjustments.  His primary alteration is in theorizing the existence of 
multiple cultural frameworks at any given time: where Sahlins imagined cultural schemas that were 
generally coterminous with national boundaries, Sewell posited that schemas existed on a number of 
different levels of social organization, presenting often conflicting influences on individual action.  This 
perspective provides a clearer understanding of how a specific cultural structure can be transformed by 
showing how actors choose from within a range of possible schemas when coming to terms with disruptive 
developments—privileging certain systems over others and thereby causing structural change. 
 
9 William Sewell, Jr. Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005), 219. 
  6 
 
 
highlights Napoleon’s continued reliance on the revolutionary past while also 
demonstrating the changes caused by this relationship. 
This study employs a wide variety of sources.  In examining administrative goals, 
I use government documents from both the revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, paying 
particular attention to legislative records and senatus consulta of the consular senate.  I 
also look at a wide range of unofficial pamphlets and memoranda, which were 
disseminated amongst the revolutionary and Napoleonic bureaucracies and detailed 
various government projects and agendas.  Complementing this material are articles from 
the Journal de Paris and Le Moniteur Universel, two of the seven Parisian newspapers 
permitted to publish during Napoleon’s reign.  Both of these publications provide 
extensive information on public events.  Of final interest are several memoirs and 
journals written during the period of Napoleonic rule.  These works come from a variety 
of people—including opponents and supporters of the regime, and top-ranking officials.  
For all of these documents, I am concerned not only with what they describe, but also 
with the tone they convey and the language they deploy. 
I begin this work by examining evidence of political continuity between the 
Revolution and Napoleonic period.  The first section explores this dynamic by looking at 
the links between Napoleonic and revolutionary property legislation, using these 
connections to explore broader ideological overlap.  The second delves into the political 
language of the Napoleonic era, particularly the legislative debates over whether or not to 
turn the Consulate into an empire.  The discussions here provide key insights into how 
Napoleon’s authority was conceptualized, and how discourse was translated into new 
understandings of power.  The third section analyzes Napoleonic festivals, examining 
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how images of authority were projected within a distinctly public setting.  The period of 
focus for this work is the Consulate (1799 to 1804).  Coming immediately after the 
Revolution, the Consulship dealt with many of the same concerns as the late Directory, 
and thus easily reproduced its familiar ideals and practices.  Moreover, as a transitional 
phase between republic and empire, it encompassed a variety of interests and agendas.  
As the temporal and ideological distance between the Revolution and Napoleonic rule 
grew more pronounced, and as conquest made Napoleon’s regime increasingly 
transnational in scope, this connection to the revolutionary past became increasingly 
attenuated.  Under the Consulate, however, it remained strong.  Thus this work explores 
the issue of revolutionary continuity when it played its most important role in structuring 
the political imaginary.
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Political Continuity 
 
From the beginning of his reign, Napoleon clearly asserted his ties to the 
Revolution.  To the troops he assembled for the coup of the 18 Brumaire he claimed that 
he had the best intentions of the Republic in mind, declaring that “liberty, victory, and 
peace would return (replaceront) the French Republic to the rank it had occupied in 
Europe.”10  As first consul, he continued to advertise this idea through public displays 
that broadcasted his connection to the ideology of the Revolution.  His advisors aided in 
this process.  Joseph Fouché, the minister of the police, prodded Napoleon to make 
“exterior demonstrations favorable to republican ideas,” and noted proudly in his 
memoires when he ended a banquet on 14 July 1800 with a toast to “The French people; 
our sovereign.”11  Later, Napoleon was even more direct.  During the 1804 execution of 
the Duc d’Enghien, for example, he proclaimed assuredly, “I am the French Revolution.  
I say it again and stick by it.”12  At times, Napoleon remained deliberately vague about 
his political intentions, embracing a number of agendas in order to appeal to as large a 
constituency as possible.13  Publicly, though, he was unambiguously a revolutionary. 
                                                
10 “Aux Soldats,” Journal de Paris, 10 November 1799. 
 
11 Joseph Fouché, The Duke of Otranto, Minister of the General Police of France (Boston: Wells and Lilly, 
1825), 121. 
 
12 David Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as we Know It (Boston 
and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2007), 228. 
 
13 Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2004, 226. 
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What were the political realities behind this posturing?  For Napoleon, security of 
the state trumped revolutionary designs to rejuvenate society through the inculcation of 
republican values, and the creation of an efficient administrative apparatus limited 
opportunities for popular politicking.  As James Livesey claims, “Those who thought that 
modern liberal values would be secured under authoritarian rule were soon disabused of 
their illusions.”14  Still, important continuities with revolutionary republicanism existed 
during the Consulate.  Napoleon’s government engaged explicitly with the social and 
legal doctrines of the Assembly and early Convention, reproducing aspects of this policy 
through legislation meant to encourage centralization and stability.  The Napoleonic 
regime, in this sense, represented the next step in the revolutionary progression—a move 
away from post-Thermidorian strife toward greater control and safety.  In the process, 
Napoleon supplanted republican moeurs as a unifying force within the French state.  Thus 
Republicanism was stripped of its far-reaching implications, becoming less a program of 
comprehensive social, political, and cultural reform than an administrative foundation 
upon which the policies of the Consulate were affixed.   
A useful example of this continuity, and the ways in which republican policies 
changed even as they were reproduced, comes from Napoleon’s use of revolutionary 
property law.  The Revolution’s legislation on proprietorship combined republican ideals 
with the real political concern of encouraging stability through rational social policy.  The 
1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen abolished privilege, releasing property 
from its particularist and seigniorial fetters and redefining it along simple lines of 
ownership.  The seizing of church lands accompanied this process, and the sale of this 
confiscated property, known as biens nationaux, helped underwrite the new French 
                                                
14 Livesey, Making Democracy in the French Revolution, 235. 
  10 
 
 
currency.  Proprietary restructuring, then, not only raised funds for the Republic, but also 
gave buyers a material incentive for supporting the state.15  The dissolution of privilege, 
moreover, helped rationalize the Assembly government by removing corporate 
impediments.  Thus the dual aims of revising property law and creating a concerned 
republican citizenry became increasingly intertwined.16  Growing disorder would reduce 
the impact of these social, political, and financial reforms, but throughout the 1790s, this 
reworked property legislation played an integral role in the attempt by various 
revolutionary regimes to construct stable and efficient administrations. 
The prospect of fiscal and social stability retained its appeal well beyond 
Brumaire, even though mob violence, recurring insolvency, and arbitrary confiscations of 
noble and ecclesiastical properties militated against the security that property law was 
supposed to provide.  Indeed, for Napoleon’s government, property represented “a social 
anchor that was lost but has been rediscovered”17—that is, an administrative achievement 
obscured, but not destroyed, by the chaos of the 1790s.  Napoleonic policy thus defended 
and reapplied much of this earlier legislation, reproducing aspects of it with remarkable 
consistency.  The Constitution of the Year VIII (24 December 1799), for instance, firmly 
defended the biens nationaux: neither reconciliation with the church nor the 1802 
amnesty granted to the émigrés resulted in the return of confiscated property.18  Later 
                                                
15 Donald Sutherland, France 1789-1815: Revolution and Counterrevolution (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986), 105. 
 
16 William Sewell, Jr., Work and Revolution in France: The Language of Labor from the Old Regime to 
1848 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 136. 
 
17 Nicolas François de Neufchâteau, Discours pour l’ouverture du collège électoral du département des 
Vosges (1 Floréal an XI), BNF: 4-LE47-7, 21 April 1803. 
 
18 Sutherland, France 1789-1815, 358. 
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iterations of the French constitution under Napoleon further guaranteed these exchanges, 
ensuring, as one member of the Tribunate termed it, their “irrevocability.”19  Finally, the 
biens nationaux were tied into developments in consular military culture, with Napoleon 
allocating shares of them to each cohort of recipients of the newly established Légion 
d’Honneur.20  Using revolutionary property policy as a model, Napoleon thus made land 
ownership, and the defense of proprietary rights, a fundamental component of his new 
political order.     
Still, for the Napoleonic regime, property was a tool of governance, not a means 
of inculcating republican values.  The centralizing and stabilizing principles behind the 
defense of property remained consistent into the Consulate; the explicit connection with 
participatory politics did not.  With the law of 18 Pluviôse an VIII (7 February 1800), 
biens nationaux—once a means of encouraging popular concern for the financial health 
of the state—fell under the administration of departmental prefects, replacing inefficient 
local managers with a professional bureaucracy, but also reducing civilian influence in 
this area.21  Property ownership, furthermore, came to determine voter eligibility, such 
that only the 600 wealthiest citizens of each department enjoyed full franchise rights.22  
In this sense, proprietorship became a measure of exclusivity, playing an important role 
in the creation of a new set of fiscal and social prerogatives meant to ensure loyalty to the 
                                                
19 “Motion d’ordre du tribun curée, sur l’émission d’un vœu tendant à ce que Napoléon Bonaparte, 
actuellement premier consul, soit déclaré Empereur des Français, et à ce que la dignité impériale soit 
déclarée héréditaire dans sa famille, 10 Floréal an XII, 30 avril 1804,” BNF: L 1.8-M4-38496, La 
proclamation du Premier Empire ou Recueil des pièces et actes relatifs à l’établissement du gouvernement 
impérial héréditaire, imprimé par ordre du Sénat conservateur. 
 
20 « L’événement le plus important de la Révolution » : La vente des biens nationaux en France et dans les 
territoires annexés (Paris: Société des études robespierristes et Éditions du CTHS, 2000), 31. 
21 Sutherland, France 1789-1815, 344. 
 
22 Jennifer Heuer, The Family and the Nation: Gender and Citizenship in Revolutionary France, 1789-1830 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 129-130. 
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state.  Rather than inhibiting centralized administration through particularism, though, it 
became a cornerstone of efficient governance.  Determined to build his regime upon 
“masses of granite,” Napoleon established a category of notables drawn from property 
holders whose lands produced an annual income of a least 150 to 200 francs—rewarding 
this group with wealth and the opportunity for continued social mobility, and earmarking 
its most competent members for service in the bureaucracy.23  By tying property together 
with the opportunity for state-sponsored privilege, Napoleon created a professional and 
dedicated aristocratic corps capable of staffing administrative posts at all levels of the 
government.   
In one sense, this development entailed the recovery of an Old Regime 
understanding of proprietorship—one in which privilege was considered a form of 
private property.24  Yet Napoleon’s incipient notability was rooted more explicitly in 
revolutionary rather than Old Regime ideology.  As opposed to the social prerogatives of 
the pre-revolutionary church and nobility, which ranged from tax exemptions to special 
judicial treatment, Napoleonic privilege was tied directly to political service.25  In this 
way, its reinstatement was perfectly in line with a Directorial tradition that sought to 
bolster republicanism through the construction of a specialized, technocratic elite.26  
                                                
23 Louis Bergeron and Guy Chaussinaud-Nogaret, Les « masses de granit »: Cent milles notables du 
Premier Empire (Paris : Éditions de l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 1979), 23. 
 
24 Sewell, Work and Revolution in France, 119-120. 
 
25 The debate over the de-politicized nature of Old Regime privilege has it origins in Tocqueville, who 
contrasted privilege with real political power.  Recent scholarship has revisited this issue to argue that the 
defense of tax exemptions and corporate prerogatives by the nobility and guilds provided catalyzed 
revolutionary political developments.  See Gail Bossenga, The Politics of Privilege: Old Regime and 
Revolution in Lille (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) and Michael Kwass, Privilege and the 
Politics of Taxation in Eighteenth-Century France: Liberté, Égalité, Fiscalité (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). 
 
26 Michael Broers, Europe Under Napoleon, 1799-1815 (London: Arnold, 1996), 17. 
  13 
 
 
Napoleon’s use of privilege also shared important continuities with the efforts of the 
early Assembly government.  The revolutionary campaign against corporate prerogatives 
was foremost a project of state rationalization—a removal of aristocratic, ecclesiastical, 
and guild impediments to effective administration.  Shorn of the Revolution’s vision of 
social and moral rehabilitation, Napoleon’s reestablishment of privilege through 
proprietorship nonetheless achieved a similar political goal.  The Consulship might have 
sought, in the words of senator Pierre Rœderer, to “sprout in the middle of the Republic a 
redoubtable and indestructible aristocracy,”27 but it was an aristocracy that facilitated, 
rather than hindered, domestic stability and administrative centralization.  
This reproduction of proprietary legislation was part of a broader trend toward the 
simplification of revolutionary ideology—a distillation of republican principles meant to 
ensure security and an end to instability.  After all, the legacy of the 1790s was 
problematic.  Revolution had given rise to instability and civil war.  It had taken France 
to the brink of economic ruin—striking, as one delegate of the Legislative corps claimed, 
a “fatal blow to our commercial balance, our manufacturing, our shipping.”28  If the 
political vision of the Revolution remained appealing, the chaos of the period did not.  
Indeed, Napoleon was at first so attractive because he seemed to offer a corrective to the 
many incidences of revolutionary misrule.  Factionalism characterized the politique de 
bascule (see-saw politics) of the Directory; Bonaparte, by contrast, claimed that he was 
                                                                                                                                            
 
27 Discours prononcé par Rœderer, conseiller d’état, orateur du gouvernement, dans la séance du corps 
législatif du 13 ventôse an 9, concernant le projet de loi présenté par le Gouvernement pour la formation 
des listes de notabilité, BNF: 8-LE50-50, 4 March 1801. 
 
28 Discours Prononcé par Tarteiron, Président du Corps Législatif, en annonçant la fin de la session (10 
germinal an 8), BNF: 8-LE50-50, 31 March 1800. 
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above party politics and moved to resolve this divisiveness.29  In addition, his regime 
succeeded at eliminating the culture of violence that characterized the later years of the 
Directory.  The Concordat of 1801 helped reduce sectarian conflict in the French 
countryside, and the conclusion of domestic strife led to a reduced military presence 
within France’s interior.30  Napoleonic rule, then, came to embody not only stability, but 
also an end to unsanctioned bloodshed.   
Others, however, expected his reign to guarantee a wider range of republican 
principles.  Indeed, by sweeping away disorder, Napoleon seemed to promise new life to 
revolutionary republicanism.  Thus, to ardent republicans like J.B. Say, who would 
eventually become an outspoken critic of the Napoleonic regime, the Consulate was an 
attempt to navigate between the twin evils of monarchism and Terror in search of a 
republican middle ground.31  For others, such as the Lorrainais soldier Jean-Nicolas-
Auguste Noël, Napoleon was a protector of the Republic who drew France “back from 
anarchy, and gave…[it] order and distinction.”32   The consul’s military 
accomplishments, furthermore, held the promise of greater glory for the French nation.  
The Tribunate celebrated Napoleon’s prowess as a revolutionary general, commending 
“the first magistrate of the Republic” and predicting that, “animated by his presence, our 
soldiers march to certain victory.”33  Many believed that the Napoleonic regime would 
bring about republican rejuvenation, that tutelary rule would provide the needed stability 
                                                
29 Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution, 229. 
 
30 Bell, The First Total War, 229. 
 
31 Whatmore, Republicanism and the French Revolution, 139. 
 
32 Jean Noël, With Napoleon’s Guns (London: Greenhill, 2005), 38. 
 
33 de Boulay (de la Meurthe), BNF: 8-LE50-50, 1800. 
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to reconstruct the state around liberal principles.  Though this vision proved increasingly 
difficult to maintain as Napoleon’s authoritarian tendencies became more pronounced,34 
it nonetheless remained a central thrust of his propaganda campaign.  Napoleon’s allure 
as a leader lay not only in the stability and peace that his regime provided, but also in the 
benefits to republicanism that this newfound security seemed to offer. 
Yet Napoleon was not to be constrained by the idealized visions of theorists such 
as Say, or even the more pragmatic aims of leader such as the abbé Sieyès, the architect 
of the Brumaire plot.35  Indeed, under Napoleon, republicanism slowly but surely 
changed.  His regime simplified, perhaps even bowdlerized, the ideology—removing the 
ambiguities that had plagued revolutionary administrations and refocusing republican 
ideals around material interests and concerns.  This effort was far from new, having its 
roots in Directorial attempts to reshape the French economy and eliminate destabilizing 
elements from legislative politics.  The Directory, however, lacked the domestic support 
to make this vision a reality and, as a result, had to resort to periodic purges and 
byzantine politicking to maintain a semblance of political authority.36  Napoleon, by 
contrast, could draw on deep-seated public support—popular backing that he encouraged 
through the performance of a carefully contrived public persona.  Through this process, 
he emerged as the new symbolic center of the French state, replacing broader currents of 
republican thought as the essential component of revolutionary patriotism and political 
culture. 
                                                
34 Livesey, Making Democracy in the French Revolution, 235-236. 
 
35 Broers, Europe under Napoleon, 19. 
 
36 Livesey, Making Democracy in the French Revolution, 238-239. 
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To the public at large, this effort proved wildly successful.  Napoleon had 
achieved celebrity status well before Brumaire.  While professing his admiration for “the 
great deeds performed by Bonaparte,” Jean Noël noted in criticism of the growing cult of 
Napoleon that his own “fanaticism did not go to the length of concerning myself with 
what he drank and ate, still less with whether he went to bed with a hairnet or silk 
nightcap.”37  With his seizure of power, however, Napoleon grew from a charismatic 
military leader into the apparent savior of the republic—a reputation that convinced, or at 
least was accepted without protest by, all but the most ardent supporters of democratic 
republicanism.38  Moreover, Napoleon promulgated this image with an air of pomp and 
theatricality, such that, as Fouché observed: “republicanism was observed to lose every 
day some portion of its gloomy austerity, and conversions in favor of unity of power were 
seen to multiply.”39  Articulating its designs within the political language of the 
Revolution, the Napoleonic regime maintained affective ties to a republican past at the 
same time as it modified it to make it less unpredictable. 
It is here that the cultural and symbolic facets of revolutionary republicanism are 
especially important to consider.  Disaggregated from the policies of Napoleon’s regime, 
they nonetheless endured through both political language and ritual.  People relied upon 
republican vocabulary and ideology to conceptualize and describe Napoleonic rule.  
Unanchored in political reality, however, their meaning gradually changed.  This 
transition stemmed from more than just the co-option of revolutionary symbolism.  
Napoleon pushed his symbolic links with the sacred icons of revolutionary 
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republicanism,40 but the transformation of republican ideals and language resulted 
primarily from their continued utility in making sense of new political developments.   
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Chapter Three: Defining Napoleon 
 
 The Revolution, in the eyes of its leaders, represented a clean break from the 
French past.  With history neither anchoring revolutionary thought nor offering a model 
for emulation, the rhetoric of the period played a significant role in defining its 
conceptual dimensions.  Even seemingly banal linguistic concerns were considered 
significant and, as a result of this development, discursive practices became highly 
regulated.  In this way, the rhetoric of the Revolution imposed itself on everyday life.  To 
reinforce secularism, for instance, revolutionaries removed the prefix “Saint” or “Sainte” 
from place names such as the Faubourg Saint-Antoine and the Rue Saint-Nicaise.41  To 
encourage social leveling, they toyed with the idea of discarding “vous,” the formal 
“you.” 42 This wrangling over discursive minutiae occurred because revolutionaries 
believed that language, severed from a corrupting past, could effect real political and 
social change.  The fervently nationalist verses of songs such as the Marseillaise infused 
the citizenry with patriotic spirit and helped provide willing volunteers for the defense of 
the Revolution.  The authority of Louis XVI, by contrast, was not fully divested until the 
Convention stripped him of his royal title.  As the Revolution gave new emphasis to the 
transformative power of words, command over language assumed a new urgency. 
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This urgency remained under Napoleon.  The challenges, however, were different 
than they were during the Revolution.  Revolutionaries in the 1790s sought to convert 
ideology into political practice, privileging language by disowning the policies and 
customs of France’s monarchical past.  The Napoleonic administration, by contrast, 
retained a strong connection to the recent past, both through its policies and its 
pronouncements.  As a result, the political language of the Revolution, its vocabulary, 
idioms, and tropes, remained in common usage, even after the political realities to which 
they referred had changed.  Used to make sense of Napoleonic rule—to describe consular 
policy and, most significantly, to understand Napoleon’s place within the French state—
their meaning gradually shifted.  Republican ideology and language became conflated 
with tutelary, and eventually hereditary, rule, and thoroughly embedded in the figure of 
Napoleon.  This trend was part of a more general conceptual shift, one in which 
Napoleon became France’s new symbolic center: a figure with cultural, social, and 
political significance, and around whom new understandings of patriotism and service to 
the state coalesced. 
Untroubled by public resistance to the irregularities within its claims, the 
Napoleonic regime could concentrate on creating an appealing political message without 
worrying about precision of meaning or the compatibility of its assertions.43  Taking 
advantage of the fungible nature of revolutionary republicanism, it at once drew upon 
political symbols from the Old Regime and Revolution, creating a hybrid political 
language that broadcast Napoleon’s links to a reimagined French cultural tradition.  
Removed from the threat of political opposition, this language became a way of 
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conceptualizing a new synthesis within this history, one that elided seemingly 
incongruent images of the Revolution and Old Regime.  A useful example of this shifting 
nature of republican political language comes from the changing nature of the classical 
republican idiom—the recurring reference to the political practices of ancient Greece and 
Rome, which varied dramatically in form and meaning throughout the Old Regime, 
Revolution, and Napoleonic period.   
Polemicists, political economists, and philosophes made frequent reference to 
antiquity in the political debates that preceded and followed 1789, drawing heavily on 
classical history and literature to define and contextualize contemporary political 
developments.  The Bordelais lawyer Joseph Saige exemplified this trend in his work 
Caton, ou Entretien sur la liberté et les vertus politiques (1770), a political tract that used 
an imagined discussion between the philosophers Cato, Cicero, and Favonius as a vehicle 
for challenging monarchal despotism.44  The abbé de Mably, another influential critic of 
the Old Regime, evoked Sparta and republican Rome as utopian models and argued for 
reforms based on the civic virtues of these ancient city-states.45  Offering a window into 
political alternatives, these references to antiquity provided the starting point for an 
academic discourse concerning the applicability of classical republican paradigms to the 
administration of a modern European state.  With the notable exception of Mably, most 
political theorists found the Spartan and Roman examples unsuited for the management 
of a large, commercial nation; instead, classical allusions helped frame debates about the 
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merits of representative government.46  During the Revolution, however, examples from 
antiquity acquired greater significance: in eschewing the French past, revolutionaries 
turned to antiquity for a sense of historical precedence.47  In this instance, classical 
republicanism served as a model for change.   
In the Old Regime, critics packaged this idiom with discussions of Rousseau’s 
General Will to create a language that opposed absolutist rule.48  Revolutionaries retained 
this rhetoric, but they also radicalized it.  In part, this process was the outcome of an 
extreme interpretation of the Enlightenment ideal, rooted in both Lockean epistemology 
and Spartan and Roman models of civic virtue, that society could shape human nature.49  
During the Old Regime, Rousseau’s claim that social order “takes away man’s own 
forces in order to give him new ones which are alien to him” formed the basis of debates 
concerning the responsibility of the state;50 during the Revolution, this idea was a call for 
action.  The oppositional rhetoric of Rousseau, Mably, and others, articulated through 
references to the classical republican idiom, became a language of crisis: a need for social 
transformation that eventually gave way to a need for Terror.51  Once these critical 
threads were combined with an opportunity for political change, the problem of a 
perpetual Revolution—a self-renewing cycle of violence meant to strip away obstacles to 
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the expression of virtue and the General Will—became apparent.52  Carrying with it an 
expectation of moral regeneration, revolutionary classical republicanism merged with 
broader political and social developments to set the stage for the violence and instability 
of 1793 and 1794.   
In each of its various iterations, the classical republican idiom fixated on concerns 
of civic pride and service.  Carried to the extreme, this focus assumed destructive 
dimensions, but many of the general themes that it represented—patriotism, camaraderie, 
and discipline—were not in themselves deleterious to the social order.  Indeed, bereft of 
the critical agenda, classical republicanism could serve as a source of stability, providing 
a model for public education, the celebration of national festivals, and love of the patrie.  
It also became more pervasive, emerging from academic discourse to become 
increasingly enmeshed in material and symbolic culture, with clothing, statuary, and 
architecture designed to reflect and inculcate ancient republican and democratic themes.53  
Under the Napoleonic regime, which retained the rationalizing and centralizing aims of 
revolutionary policy but abandoned its regenerative goals, classical republicanism served 
as the basis for a new understanding of patriotism and state security, one that centered on 
images of Napoleon and strong executive rule.  
The Consulate couched itself in the classical symbols of the revolutionary 
period—the fasces, togaed legislators, Greek and Roman names—using them to address 
new political developments.  At Napoleon’s prodding, Sieyès dropped his vision of 
Napoleon as a “Great Elector,” a ceremonial political figure, during the debates preceding 
the creation of the Constitution of the Year VIII, labeling him instead with the 
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classically-inspired title of First Consul.  What emerged, then, was a powerful executive 
office that, as it broke with an ancient republican tradition of balanced, representative 
government,54 redefined virtue and civic pride along new lines of sovereignty.  Indeed, 
classical republicanism helped frame understandings of the consular state.  An address by 
Senate president François de Neufchâteau two days before Napoleon’s coronation as 
emperor relied upon classical republican symbolism to adumbrate Napoleonic authority, 
claiming that “the unity of the Empire is the fasces of his [Napoleon’s] power.”  
Conflating this symbol—an emblem of popular authority during the Revolution—with 
hereditary monarchy, Neufchâteau continued by predicting a recurrence of violent 
factionalism unless Napoleon secured his line through “the inheritance of the fasces.”55   
The classical idiom therefore disguised Napoleon’s accumulation of personal 
power.  It also reaffirmed his political standing by providing examples of his service to 
the state.  Drafting a pamphlet in 1800 entitled, A Parallel among Caesar, Cromwell, 
Monck, and Bonaparte, Lucien—Napoleon’s brother—conflated Caesar’s achievements 
with those of his sibling, all the while taking care to show that while the latter restored 
stability and representative government by relying upon the support of notables and 
rentiers, the former had ultimately succumbed to demagoguery.56  During the Revolution, 
classical republicanism served a variety of agendas: criticizing monarchy and 
constructing representative authority, modeling virtue and articulating crisis.  After 
Brumaire, allusions to antiquity served to support the state, demonstrating its benefits for 
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the common weal.  In the same speech as above, for example, Neufchâteau drew upon the 
example of Rome to justify the creation of an Empire.  Proclaiming that “all of the 
celebrated republics in history were concentrated upon either sterile mountains or within 
a single city,” and that “beyond them, the subject provinces were in constant despair and 
ruin,” he ended by noting that France extended beyond the immediate concerns of 
Paris—using this point to argue that the key to efficient and fair administration lay in 
Napoleon’s accrual of additional executive powers.57    
In this way, Neufchateau reproduced an earlier discourse concerning the 
inapplicability of classical republican models to the management of a large commercial 
nation.  Instead of searching for republican alternatives, however, he used references to 
Rome to validate current state policy.  Allusions to antiquity thus served to explain and 
justify the transition to empire, demonstrating the limitations of republican government 
and thus drawing attention to the benefits of Napoleonic rule.  Detractors of the state also 
drew upon antiquity in their criticisms of Napoleon, merging classical republicanism with 
a language of modern liberalism to illuminate the Consulate’s flaws.58  With censorship 
limiting opportunities for opposition, however, this hostile discourse was increasingly 
marginalized.  Instead, more mainstream usage of the classical idiom identified the 
Consulate as a seat of stability and authority, pointing to Napoleonic rule as France’s 
only viable political option.   
What does this example say about the general changes in political language under 
Napoleon?  In one sense, it points to a general de-radicalization of political agendas.  The 
                                                
57 “Senat, M. François (de Neufchâteau) president,” Le Moniteur Universel, 2 December 1804. 
 
58 Jainchill, Reimagining Politics after the Terror, 11. 
 
  25 
 
 
extreme Rousseauian rhetoric of the pre-Thermidorian Revolution proved less 
compelling in the aftermath of the Terror, a trend that continued into the Consulate 
period.  Excluded from government, and finding few literary outlets through which to 
articulate their beliefs, radicals—and radical language—became increasingly 
marginalized.59  More precisely, though, this transition points to a re-centering of the 
political order.  The Napoleonic regime protected key gains from the Revolution and 
offered an end to domestic strife.  In so doing, however, it effected a fundamental 
depoliticization of civilian life.  In place of participation in the political process were an 
actual sense of stability and a premise of continuity with the social and political 
improvements made by the various revolutionary governments.  Significantly, these ideas 
collapsed onto a fixed center: Napoleon.  Political language, then, served both to 
reinforce the Napoleonic regime’s control and define the normative contours of this 
newly-depoliticized order.  That is, it expansively defined Napoleon’s authority and laid 
down new expectations for duty and civil obedience. 
A useful glimpse at this process comes from the legislative sessions of the 
Consulate period, in particular the debate behind the 1804 senatus consultum,60 which 
ratified the plebiscite declaring Napoleon emperor.  These speeches come from the 
Senate, a plenary assembly that appointed members in the two lower legislatures, the 
Tribunate, which debated the terms of government bills, but lacked the power to approve 
them, and the Legislative corps, an intermediate body that could vote through, but not 
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alter, these bills.61  Although most accounts proved obsequious and self-serving, they 
nonetheless shed light on Napoleon’s symbolic significance—the numerous ways in 
which his authority was understood and represented.  Moreover, these sources bring 
attention to the processes behind Napoleon’s accumulation of power, particularly in his 
transition from first consul to hereditary emperor.  Discussions of his wide-ranging 
accomplishments are laced with references to the Revolution and Old Regime, lending 
further weight to his successes and also justifying his buildup of a number of new 
prerogatives.  Of specific interest is the way in which this very processual vision—
Napoleon’s rise to emperorship was articulated through a contingent series of events in 
which his administrative gains were translated into a call for the creation of a new royal 
line—was counterpoised with a number of symbolic ambiguities.  References to the 
Revolution not only contextualized the First Consul’s accomplishments, they also 
showed the practical inadequacies of revolutionary rule and sounded a call for change.  
Different in form and content, these various legislative speeches nonetheless converged 
around a similar goal: stressing Napoleon’s centrality to French political life.   
The most direct way of portraying the First Consul’s contribution to the Republic 
was through his accomplishments as a general.  The tribune Mollevault, for example, 
called him “a peacemaking conqueror, whose courage and talents strike at our 
enemies”—a typical reflection on his military prowess.62  Discussions of these successes 
are interesting in their range of attribution.  For some, Napoleon represented less an 
individual figure than a metonym for the Republic or, according to a 10 March 1800 
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extract for the Legislative Body, a facilitating “organ” through which peace was proposed 
and out of which violent punishment was meted.63  For others, Napoleon’s military gains 
were more personal.  Victories glorified both the Republic and French soldiery, but 
ultimately they were a reflection of the command, élan, and vision of the First Consul.  
The juxtaposition of peace and war, as evidenced in Mollevault’s speech, also 
represented an important consideration.  Perhaps few would go as far as Tribune 
Benjamin Constant’s Manichean claim that “there exists on the earth only two classes of 
people, the friends and the enemies of liberty,”64 but for many delegates the strict 
demarcation of peaceful France from its aggressive neighbors, and, by extension, the 
depiction of Napoleon as a peace-seeking ruler driven to conflict by the vicissitudes of 
foreign aggression, remained a recurring theme. 
Recognition of Napoleon’s impressive war record, however, was only one part of 
the effort to understand his considerable success.  If military gains had made Napoleon 
famous, his accomplishments as a politician were equally noteworthy.  During the 
proceedings for the 1804 Senatus consultum, for example, the Tribune Curée demanded 
recognition for Napoleon’s reforms, praising him, above all, as an administrator: “the 
public treasury and finances, have they [not] been handled with strict regulation and 
scrupulous accuracy?...the Civil Code, did it not emerge grandly from scholars, and from 
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the laborious discussions of jurists and officials of the state?”65  Neufchâteau, serving as 
Senate president and thus presiding over this debate, also pointed to Napoleon’s 
achievements as a reformer, calling him a “superior genius” who “reorganized our social 
order,”66 as did less saccharine accounts highlighting his success in rooting out 
factionalism, remodeling the legislature, and defending the sale of biens nationaux.  Both 
martial and political, Napoleon’s accomplishments were manifested across a broad 
spectrum, creating room for claims that his meritorious service to France justified greater 
political power.    
Although Napoleon’s achievements were impressive in their own right, they 
seemed to gain greater meaning from their relationship to the Revolution.  François 
Furet’s argument that Napoleon represented a “revolutionary king” presiding over a 
“democratic monarchy” points to the continued significance of democratic legitimacy 
after Brumaire; in effect, the popularly-oriented ideology of the Revolution remained a 
steady, if not unavoidable, influence on post-revolutionary political life.67  
Contemporaries, though, were less abstract in their praise.  During the proclamation of 
the Senatus consultum, Curée highlighted specific continuities linking the Revolution to 
the Napoleonic era: “In a word, all that the people desired in 1789 has been reestablished; 
equality is maintained; the law, which alone imposes upon the citizens the responsibility 
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for the welfare of the state, is respected.”68  The Tribune Jaubert, meanwhile, went even 
further by declaring in the same hearing that “the Revolution is fixed upon principles that 
he [Napoleon] originated.”69  These references served to make Napoleon’s successes 
seem even more meaningful.  Whether articulating these triumphs as personal 
accomplishments or state-wide achievements merely facilitated or represented by the 
First Consul, Napoleon’s efforts as both a general and a political leader were made all the 
more compelling by their linkage to a still potent revolutionary past.  
Napoleonic authority was fluidly defined by Napoleon and his followers within a 
matrix of centralized governance and revolutionary republicanism, the breadth of which 
allowed for a wide array of political claims and justifications.  It was against this 
conceptually ambiguous backdrop, for instance, that legislators formulated a call for the 
creation of a hereditary empire.  This process, according to the Tribune Curée, amounted 
to placing “the inheritance of power in a family distinguished by the Revolution (que la 
révolution a illustrée), consecrated by equality and liberty…a family whose head was the 
first soldier of the Republic before becoming its first magistrate.”70  James Livesey 
argues that the continued effort by delegates serving under Napoleon to relate political 
and social developments back to the Revolution speaks to the degree to which 
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revolutionary democracy had become normative.71  Legislators, in this sense, couched 
Napoleon’s achievements within revolutionary language because it offered a strategy 
through which to contextualize these successes and validate the transition to empire.  
Recognizable and appealing, republican discourse helped explain and justify political 
change. 
Delegates, moreover, contrasted the ideological appeal of the Revolution with its 
pragmatic shortcomings, elucidating a clear need for improvements.  Jaubert, a member 
of the Tribunate, cautioned that “the elective system, as it were, is nothing but a dreadful 
theory of revolutions.  Each transformation brings out particularist ambitions, feeds the 
spirit of faction.”72  The tribune Duvidal echoed this warning by claiming that a universal 
franchise offered few guarantees of effective control, as even the most successful leader 
could succumb to calumny and the viciousness of electoral politics.73  Hereditary rule, by 
contrast, was seen as not only a practical solution to these problems, but also as the 
apotheosis of French political development.  Duvidal again: “Heredity is a port where the 
ship of empire has found refuge for centuries, toward which the course of human affairs, 
more powerful than our vain projects, is always pointed.”74  The Revolution, then, served 
both to add weight to Napoleon’s achievements and, through the practical failures of its 
ideology, indicate a need to establish hereditary imperial rule.  Having learned from the 
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mistakes of the past, legislators sought to guarantee the future of the state through a more 
centralized system of rulership.    
Though the revolutionary idiom was packed with such implications, delegates 
also cultivated conceptual links with other areas of French history.  Curée made clear 
allusions to Charlemagne, disparaging Louis XVI while drawing ties between Napoleon 
and France’s Carolingian heyday.75  Le Moniteur Universel, one of the few approved 
Parisian newspapers, made a similar comparison in an 1804 article, linking Napoleon to 
famous monarchs such as Charlemagne and Louis XIV.76  Napoleon himself made 
frequent reference to military heroes such as Marshall Turenne, drawing links between 
the martial culture of the Old Regime and that of his own administration.77  Others went 
back to the Capetian dynasty to legitimize Napoleonic rule.  Neufchâteau, for example, 
compared the First Consul to Philippe Auguste, the medieval king who, after his victory 
at the Battle of Bouvines, asked of his soldiers if there was anyone more deserving of the 
French crown—a particularly apt allusion considering Napoleon’s military successes.78  
These references to royal precedence complemented understandings of French patriotism, 
which the revolutionaries had tried to inculcate through administrative reforms meant to 
encourage territorial unity and cultural homogeneity,79 by drawing attention to a shared 
past.  More importantly, it tied Napoleon more closely to monarchical visions of power.     
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Finally, these developments in political language also laid out new expectations 
for duty and civil obedience.  The allusions to France’s monarchical past not only 
provided a means of conceptualizing Napoleon’s power, they also couched his authority 
in a ready set of disciplinary norms.  Eighteenth century understandings of monarchy 
betrayed considerable ambiguities.  The king, for instance, was supposed to be both an 
individual and the aggregate embodiment of his subjects.80  Yet within this indefinite 
symbolic landscape there existed a clear expectation of subjecthood and submission.  
Napoleonic rule did not reinstitute the worst abuses of the Old Regime—the letters of 
cachet, unabashed rule by fiat—but it nonetheless recreated a dynamic of subordination 
and exclusivity.  The reestablishment of ties with the Catholic Church, achieved through 
the Concordat of 1801, helped to reinforce this culture of obedience by creating space for 
the use of religious idioms in demands for compliance with the administration.   
The 1806 Cathéchisme Imperial, a homiletic penned by imperial Minister of 
religion Jean-Etienne-Marie Portalis and the abbé Etienne Bernier to agitate for the semi-
autonomy of the Gallican church, shows how this development continued after the 
creation of the Empire.  Couched in religious imagery, and recited during Sunday 
services, it provided an unambiguous reminder of the power dynamic in imperial France.  
For instance, to the question “What are the duties of Christians toward the princes who 
govern them, and what in particular are our duties towards our emperor, Napoleon I?” the 
primer answered, “All Christians owe the Princes who govern them, and in particular we 
owe our emperor, Napoleon I, love, respect, obedience, loyalty, military service, and the 
taxes ordered for the preservation and the defense of the Empire and his throne.  We also 
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owe him our fervent prayers for the salvation and spiritual and temporal prosperity of the 
State.”  Furthermore, the catechism also laid out extreme penalties for disobedience: 
“According to the apostle Saint Paul, they [disobedient subjects] would be resisting the 
order established by God Himself, and would render themselves worthy of eternal 
damnation.”81  In short, lèse-majesté (or lèse-Napoleon) replaced lèse-nation, 
accumulating religiously-charged connotations in the process.  By the end of the 
Consulate period, the political vocabulary had become sufficiently expansive, and its 
ambiguities adequately tolerated, to encapsulate a wide gamut of possibilities.  As such, it 
paved the way toward imperial rule.  Napoleon gave this multi-faceted discourse a sense 
of symbolic coherence; others—delegates, bureaucrats, and other administrators—in turn 
reified Napoleon’s figurative centrality by adding the powers and prerogatives to make 
him the unquestionable epicenter of French political life.  
Overall, these efforts proved very successful.  Napoleon’s name became a 
metonym for an administrative apparatus that would eventually span the whole continent.  
Moreover, he cultivated an emotional attachment by projecting a paternal image of 
himself.82  The Journal de Paris and other newspapers helped in this process through the 
publication of sycophantic passages: “Our emotions were those of the whole world; those 
of the whole world were ours; and of all that makes up a profound sentiment, indefinable, 
eminently French—attachment, love, and the recognition of our august sovereign.” 83  
Some, however, remained unconvinced.  Charles Tinseau, an émigré who remained in 
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England even after the 1802 amnesty, wondered despondently if France would “discard 
the successor of Philip Augustus, of St. Louis, of Charles the Wise, of Louis XII, of 
Henry the Great, and of the virtuous Louis XVI for a vile Corsican, an obscure agent of 
Robespierre.”84  Still, many found the idea that Napoleon represented the heart of a new 
imperial culture compelling.  Songs celebrated his rise; poems celebrated his victories.  
One follower went so far as to create an etymological study of the name “Napoleon 
Bonaparte” through the use of Hebrew-language sources.85  Even for the skeptical, the 
sheer volume of these efforts could overwhelm dissension.   
For all the successes of these efforts, however, the new political language of the 
Consulate could only go so far toward defining Napoleon’s authority.  Having reoriented 
ideas of patriotism, civic virtue, and even the patrie around Napoleon, it took public 
displays of power to broadcast these changes across France.  To reinforce his claims, 
Napoleon had to make them visible and popularly appealing.  In doing so, he turned once 
again to the Revolution, latching onto its patterns of public celebration as a way of 
disseminating his political message.  Having defined his symbolic role through 
republican language, he capitalized upon opportunities to define his authority within a 
public setting.      
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Chapter Three: Celebrating Napoleon 
 
“Immediately before the procession of directors and the ministers will be an 
enormous fasces, on which will be inscribed the names of all the departments, and 
which will bear emblems of the rivers and mountains after which the departments 
are named.  Men dressed in the ancient clothing of the peoples who have occupied 
Gaul will carry the fasces.  Before them will be a banner bearing the inscription: 
‘The republic has united all.  There is only one people.’  Next and parallel to this 
fasces will be a trophy, formed from the escutcheons of the Batavian, Cisalpine, 
Ligurian, Helvetic, and Roman republics, and supported by emblematic figures.  
And before that, a banner bearing the words: ‘Eternal alliance with the French 
people!’”86 
 
Thus wrote François de Neufchâteau, serving at the time as minister of the interior, 
concerning plans for a 1799 festival commemorating the creation of the National 
Convention and French Republic.  Composed in August of that year, only a few months 
before the Brumaire coup, this itinerary reflected themes common to revolutionary fêtes.  
The festivals of the Revolution performed a didactic role, with processions, emblems, and 
music meant to inculcate a sense of unity, patriotism, and civic virtue.  Publicly 
reproducing the symbols of the republic, they were meant to entertain and edify.  In a 
report drafted for the National Convention, delegate Merlin de Thionville laid out the 
methods for achieving these results.  A revolutionary fête, according to him, was one in 
which attendees “should be occupied.”87  More precisely, the crowd at a festival needed 
to play an active role in the event.  According to Thionville, the level of participation 
represented the difference between a national celebration, which could instruct and 
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inspire, and a mere spectacle, which was meant only to amuse.  He therefore suggested 
methods for encouraging crowd involvement, ultimately fixing on music and drama 
because of their participatory nature.  Thionville hoped that by sharing in these activities, 
the French populace would learn the lessons of the Revolution more easily.  To achieve 
their didactic goals, revolutionary festivals had to force people to become at once 
“spectateur, auteur, et spectacle.”88  For both Neufchâteau and Thionville, these 
celebrations would put a public face to revolutionary politics, rendering the aims of the 
state public and explicit.  
This basic program of festivities remained the same under Napoleon.  National 
fêtes retained their didactic focus, with pageantry providing a potent means of political 
symbolism.  Activities too remained remarkably consistent: featuring sports, displays of 
technology (Neufchâteau’s festival boasted a hot air balloon floating over the Champ de 
Mars),89 and numerous other leisure activities and diversions.  The nature of 
participation, however, changed dramatically.  Compared to the fêtes of the Revolution, 
Napoleonic festivals were exclusionary affairs—attendees watched, but contributed little 
to the actual ceremonies.  Reduced to spectateurs, they were relegated to the margins of 
consular fêtes, passively observing as Napoleon replaced the people as the nation’s 
symbolic core.  Even more than the elite political discourse of the Consulate period, 
Napoleonic festivals elided a number of seemingly incongruent symbols.  During the 
Revolution inconsistencies in representation gave way to confusion and even violence; 
after Brumaire, political and social change helped reduce these ambiguities, even as it 
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created new ones that helped the Napoleonic state to define itself along a broad 
conceptual register.  Engaged at once with the symbols of republicanism and monarchy, 
Napoleonic festivals blended revolutionary strategy with Old Regime symbolism.  The 
effect was a production that both centered Napoleon in the eyes of his subjects and 
provided him with sovereign and religious legitimacy.  
Tensions in revolutionary symbolism allowed Napoleon to co-opt its images with 
ease,90 and the stable political and social atmosphere of the Consulate meant that 
incongruities in political symbolism went unchallenged.  This development improved 
upon a revolutionary format of celebration that had proven both sterile and unappealing.  
The festivals of the Revolution were fraught with tensions: intending to appear 
unscripted, they were actually the result of careful control and preparation; promoting 
inclusiveness, they ostracized those members of a community who did not support a 
republican agenda.91  Furthermore, in attacking religion, the Revolution robbed itself of a 
sacred center around which to orient celebrations of the state.92  Napoleonic festivals, by 
contrast, eliminated many of these ambiguities.  With the Concordat of 1801 ending the 
revolutionary injunction against Gallican ceremony, Christian ideology came to play a 
central role in Napoleonic celebrations.  Churches were restored to their original 
function—reduced no longer to an ambiguous symbolic role—and te deums punctuated 
state celebrations.  Political and confessional concerns were perhaps most clearly 
conflated in the new feast of St. Napoleon.  This 15 August holiday, which occurred 
                                                
90 Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution, 229. 
 
91 Ozouf, Festivals and the French Revolution, 11. 
 
92 Joseph Byrnes, “Celebration of the Revolutionary Festivals under the Directory: a Failure of Sacrality,” 
Church History 63, no. 2 (1994): 202. 
  38 
 
 
during the Feast of the Assumption and combined Napoleon’s birthday with the 
celebration of an eponymous Roman saint of dubious hagiography.93  By incorporating 
pre-Revolutionary ecclesiastical ritual, the Napoleonic regime infused state celebrations 
with a religious energy that was lacking in revolutionary fêtes.   
Napoleonic festivals, in addition, proved more successful than revolutionary 
celebrations in clarifying their parameters of participation.  Although the revolutionaries 
encouraged active involvement in its festivals, the nature of that participation was also 
highly circumscribed.  Thionville’s report emphasized the need for careful planning to 
make state festivals reflect the ideals of the Revolution.  Festivals were meant to 
inculcate a sense of egalitarianism, of a collective psyche and a common weal.94  The 
result, however, was fractiousness and exclusivity.  In his description of a revolutionary 
commemoration of the fall of the Bastille, for instance, Poumiès de la Siboutie recorded, 
“It need hardly be said that speeches for the other side would have been very badly 
received, and were consequently never attempted.”95  The Revolution encouraged free 
speech at the same time as it refused to acknowledge dissenting opinions.  The 
Napoleonic administration proved equally unwilling to countenance opposition, but it 
was less ambiguous in asserting its partisanship.  During its festival, there was little 
uncertainty in terms of what the people could say or do.  If Napoleonic celebrations were 
no more ideologically tolerant than those of the Revolution, they at least resolved some 
of their tensions by being more openly restrictive.  
                                                
93 For an in-depth history of this festival, especially its reintroduction during the Second Empire, see Sudhir 
Hazareesingh, The Saint-Napoleon: Celebrations of Sovereignty in Nineteenth-Century France 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 2004). 
 
94 Inge Baxmaan, Die Feste der Französischen Revolution: Inszenierung von Gesellschaft als Natur 
(Weinheim: Beltz Verlag 1984), 31. 
 
95 Siboutie, Recollections of a Parisian, 30. 
  39 
 
 
Where Napoleonic festivals emulated revolutionary fêtes most clearly was in the 
military festivals of the Revolution.  The army represented one of the first laboratories in 
an experiment to inculcate France with the ideals of the Revolution; through 
commissioners, pamphlets, and other instructive efforts, Jacobins attempted to provide 
soldiers with both an understanding of, and an emotional connection to, revolutionary 
ideology.96  After Thermidor, however, this didactic program was scaled back.  Without 
constant reinforcement, celebration of the ideals of the revolution became conflated with 
the celebration of a specific army’s military achievements and élan.  The Army of Italy’s 
commemoration ceremony on 14 July 1797, for instance, not only memorialized the fall 
of the Bastille—it also honored recently fallen comrades.97  The death of revolutionary 
general Lazare Hoche in 1797 was celebrated as a national loss, but with competitions to 
venerate him in songs and marches—Napoleon offered a medal worth 60 sequins 
(Venetian zecchino) to the composer who could craft the best memorial overture98—and 
an elegiac ceremony on the Champ de Mars, the honoring of individual achievement 
could obscure more general celebrations of the republic.  Significantly, this pattern of 
commemoration added stratification to an event that was ostensibly egalitarian.  
Charismatic generals like Napoleon, Hoche, and Moreau represented larger-than-life 
figures in their individual commands, and thus assumed symbolic prominence in 
revolutionary festivals. 
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This juxtaposition of the nation and the individual was on clear display during the 
1797 state triumph thrown for Napoleon upon his return from the successful Italian 
campaign.  Jeanne Récamier, a young woman who frequented directorial balls and other 
events of France’s newly restored high society, noted the details of the ceremony: “This 
solemn celebration took place in the great courtyard of the Luxembourg place.  At the 
back of the courtyard was an altar and statue of Liberty; at the foot of this symbol the five 
directors wore Roman costumes; the ministers, ambassadors, and various functionaries 
were arranged around the seats of the amphitheatre; behind them, were benches reserved 
for other invited guests.”99  On display were the symbols and major officials of the 
Republic, yet were they all arranged to receive and observe Napoleon; in effect, the 
collective, faceless patrie was reoriented around the Revolution’s most successful 
commander.  Jean-Pierre Doguereau, a soldier who fought with Napoleon in Egypt, casts 
light on a similar dynamic in his record of a 1799 festival that occurred while on 
campaign: “After various maneuvers and formations, among which firing as a battalion, 
as a platoon, and by ranks was carried out, all the troops marched past the general, who, 
in the middle of the ceremony, had addressed the army.”100  Napoleon was the literal and 
figurative center of both festivals; displayed for his benefit, they gained meaning from 
him watching them.  If, as Denise Davidson claims, “revolutionary festivals focused on 
the sovereignty of the people” whereas “Napoleonic ones centered on the sovereign 
himself,”101 this transition nonetheless had is roots in directorial celebrations of military 
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achievement.  It was here that notions of patriotism, civic duty, and loyalty to the 
Republic became bound up with Napoleon’s image—setting the stage for later patterns of 
celebration during the Consulate period.  
Like Neufchâteau’s itinerary for the commemoration of the founding of the 
Republic, Napoleonic festivals exhibited a high degree of planning and control.  Plans for 
Napoleon’s coronation, for instance, reveal a painstakingly defined marching order.  At 
the beginning of the parade, Mamluk bodyguards and other elite units surrounded 
Napoleon as he departed the Tuileries; by the time of his crowning, dignitaries and high-
ranking officials had replaced these troops as the Emperor’s entourage. 102  Artillery 
announced transitions and punctuated important events, while drums and military 
instruments helped keep time for the many army units involved in the ceremony.103  This 
organization also created a sense of hierarchy.  Class factored heavily in determining 
one’s contribution to Napoleonic celebrations,104 and the careful control of space and 
time helped differentiate functions and make a clear delineation between spectators and 
participants.  Indeed, for the lower class, participation in a state festival was often a 
function of an individual’s willingness to sacrifice him or herself for the good of the 
nation.  One of the few ways in which working class women could actively participate in 
these fêtes, for example, was through rural mass marriage ceremonies in which they were 
wedded to veterans of the French army.105    
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This exclusion and demarcation is clearly evident in the festivities surrounding 
Napoleon’s coronation in 1804.  Whereas revolutionary festivals typically occurred in a 
public forum such as the Champ de Mars, Napoleon’s crowning ceremony took place in a 
private session at Notre Dame.  Most Parisians, as a result, did not witness the actual 
coronation.  Napoleon’s procession to Notre Dame further demonstrates the non-
participatory nature of the event.  Although he walked along the streets of Paris, viewable 
by thousands, the participants in the final leg of his parade route included only a limited 
entourage of ministers, military officers, and other dignitaries who escorted Napoleon 
and Josephine, as well as helped carry their robes.106  In many ways, the coronation 
seemed more in line with Thionville’s definition of a spectacle than his understanding of 
a national fête.  For days before the festival, the Journal de Paris ran advertisements 
offering spaces to rent along the procession route.107  In place of real participation, people 
settled for the opportunity to see Napoleon and the fireworks, colorful facades, and 
informal celebrations that accompanied his crowning.  Finally, an undercurrent of 
paternalism further separated Napoleon and his entourage from the people attending this 
festival.  In commemoration of the crowning, a subsidy of three francs was distributed to 
families on the government bread dole.108  At the same time, attorney M. Jobert l’ainé 
used the coronation as an excuse to request the pardon for several prisoners condemned 
                                                
106 “Variétés,” Journal de Paris, 30 November 1804. 
 
107 “Fêtes du Couronnement,” Journal de Paris, 29 November 1804. 
 
108 “Nouvelles de Paris,” Journal de Paris, 2 December 1804. 
 
  43 
 
 
during the Revolution.109  Charity and grace, the traditional domain of Old Regime 
monarchs, essentially provided further space between Napoleon and his subjects. 
Many of the activities of Napoleonic festivals were drawn directly from the 
republican celebrations of the revolutionary period.  Neufchâteau planned to include 
numerous games and other diversions at his state festival, including a mock naval battle 
near the Champ de Mars and a variety of exhibits showcasing the recent achievements of 
French industry.110  Similarly, during the 1806 festival of St. Napoleon’s Day, celebrants 
competed for prize money in games such as bowling and engaged in water sports.  
Groups of musicians, two of whom were placed around each game, contributed further to 
the fanfare, as did fireworks and the illumination of the Hôtel-de-Ville at the end of the 
festivities.111  Napoleonic festivals tended to conform to a pattern in which play occupied 
an increasingly central role the later one got in a specific fête.  Events typically began 
with speeches and parades, moved to gaming and feasting, and ended with dancing and 
other revelry.112   
Balls and dances, whether as a continuation of earlier celebrations or stand-alone 
gatherings, constituted an important facet of Napoleonic fêtes, suggesting links to the 
elite soirées that had reemerged during the directorial period.  On the official level, 
dances helped adorn the state with a sense of fashion and pomp.  They performed a 
political function by placing elite families in close contact with Napoleon and his 
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officials, establishing ties between the administration and France’s reconstituted social 
elite.113  Private balls, by contrast, offered people a chance to celebrate national events in 
style.  Though the participation levels were limited in Napoleonic festivals, a surfeit of 
lanterns, streamers, and other decorations available for private purchase offered people a 
chance to celebrate Napoleon on their own terms.    
As the delineation between festival participants and attendees at these various 
festivals suggests, Napoleon formed the symbolic and emotional center of consular 
celebrations.  During the coronation ceremony, for instance, regiments marched by the 
emperor, bowed to him, and received their regimental eagle.114  Other festivals were built 
around seminal moments in the life of the Emperor.  St. Napoleon’s Day celebrated his 
birthday; a national holiday on 4 December commemorated both his coronation and his 
iconic victory at Austerlitz.  His presence, moreover, gave these festivals meaning.  A 
report detailing the celebration of St. Napoleon’s Day in 1807 recorded, for instance: 
“The popular and affable air of the Emperor increased yet again the intoxication that the 
multitude felt in perceiving his triumphal float.”115 Napoleonic festivals, in effect, saw a 
return of the “sovereign’s gaze” that had recognized and affirmed the value of subjects 
under the old regime.   Like the former visibility of the king, which had helped create and 
validate noble service in an earlier time, Napoleon’s public prominence reminded 
subjects of both his centrality to the state and expectations of obedience.116  Extrapolating 
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this basic framework to Napoleonic festivals, it was Napoleon’s supervision of festivities 
that invested them with a sense of public significance.  
Just as Napoleon’s “gaze” provided state festivals with a sense of significance, 
however, so too did he depend on the esteem of others to legitimize his authority.  In 
effect, Napoleonic celebrations embodied aspects of Habermas’s “representative public 
sphere”—an Old Regime power dynamic in which the authority of nobles and kings 
existed only “inasmuch as they made it present.”117  Still, Napoleonic festivals were more 
than a return to pre-revolutionary display of authority; rather, they occupied a liminal 
space between Revolution and Old Regime.  Just as these celebrations projected personal 
power, so too did they contain a functional component that was conspicuously lacking in 
Old Regime pageantry.  Unlike Old Regime monarchs, Napoleon did not possess his 
authority innately.  Festivals during his reign not only validated his sovereignty through 
public display, they actively constructed it.  Entailing the reconceptualization of 
revolutionary ideology along monarchical lines, they were the reversal of the process 
described by Habermas, where representational authority gave way to power reflected by 
productive capacity in a bourgeois economy.118  In non-Marxist terms, these celebrations 
refocused Napoleon’s actual power into representative structures that could provide him 
with sovereign legitimacy.  
 Napoleonic festivals thus combined military regimentation and lighthearted 
revelry in a dynamic that promoted emotional ties to the Emperor.  They also reminded 
attendees of the increasingly royal dimensions of Napoleonic power.  The result was a 
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fixation on Napoleon—a public display that reinforced his place as the state’s symbolic 
center.  This development emerged directly out of the celebratory practices of the 
revolutionary republic, with the consular regime reproducing both the content of these 
festivals, and their broader didactic purpose.  After Brumaire, the French populace still 
commemorated the nation, but it was a nation bound up inextricably with the image of 
Napoleon.
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five: Conclusion 
 
 In conceptualizing his power in the present, Napoleon first had to conceptualize 
the past.  The revolutionaries, in creating the Old Regime, desired a simple history 
against which they could define themselves.  Napoleon, on the other hand, favored 
complexity.  To borrow a structuralist metaphor, he was a bricoleur—delving into a 
diverse history to lay the foundations for a multi-layered present.  Downplaying or 
ignoring potential ambiguities, Napoleon was able to place himself firmly within the 
revolutionary tradition at the same time as he combined its discourse and practices with 
Old Regime symbolism to construct the ideological dimensions of a new political order.  
 Napoleon never repudiated the Revolution as sharply as the revolutionaries did 
the Old Regime because he was in many ways a product of the Revolution.  His 
advancement, his fame, his success—all of these were borne out of his achievements as a 
revolutionary general.  The Revolution also gave him a framework for understanding the 
world.  The vocabulary, symbolism, and practices of the new political order would have 
been familiar to both Napoleon and his followers, and if Bonaparte’s emphasis on 
continuity with the revolutionary tradition proved useful to his political agenda, in 
simpler terms this process was the result of Napoleon defining his political vision through 
the language and imagery with which he was most familiar.  Still, in the later stages of 
building his regime, Napoleon increasingly cast revolutionary ideology in a dichotomous 
relationship with the ideals of the Empire.  If this process came about slowly, it 
nevertheless came about eventually. 
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 The creation of a revolutionary and imperial binary might have ultimately helped 
determine the shape of the Revolution’s legacy.  To understand the Empire, Napoleon 
continued to clarify the ideological dimensions of the revolutionary period, a process that 
became easier as the Revolution grew more distant in time.  Such a process packaged the 
Revolution into a simple, appealing set of beliefs.  Even if just for ease of comparison, 
Napoleon ultimately elided the very serious differences between the various 
revolutionary regimes to create instead a more palatable idea of the Revolution.  If 
Napoleon thus advertised his connections to a vital and complicated revolutionary past in 
the early part of his regime, by the latter part of his reign he tended toward simplification.  
In eventually inventing the Empire, Bonaparte also helped reinvent the Revolution.   
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